Yellow Paper

Soleer: A Decentralized Peer-to-Peer Services Marketplace

Abstract

Soleer is a decentralized peer-to-peer services marketplace built on the Solana blockchain. This paper introduces novel mechanisms for service listing, reputation management, and dispute resolution through the use of smart contracts. The system leverages Solana's proof-of-history consensus mechanism to achieve high throughput and low latency while maintaining decentralized governance.

The core components of the Soleer system include:

1. Service Listing Model: A standardized format for describing service offerings, including provider details, metadata, pricing, and availability.

2. Reputation System: An on-chain reputation scoring mechanism that factors in transaction success rates, client satisfaction, response times, and dispute resolution outcomes.

3. Escrow Mechanism: A smart contract-based escrow system that secures funds and automates the release process based on predefined conditions.

4. Dispute Resolution Protocol: A decentralized arbitration process that selects reputable participants to vote on conflict resolutions, ensuring fairness and transparency.

The paper provides a formal definition of the Soleer system architecture, economic model, and security properties. Additionally, it presents a performance analysis that demonstrates the platform's ability to scale and deliver low-latency transactions. Finally, it discusses scalability considerations, including the use of sharding and state channels to handle growing transaction volumes.

By combining the benefits of blockchain technology with a focus on user experience and economic incentives, Soleer is building a robust and trustworthy peer-to-peer services marketplace that empowers freelancers and clients around the world.

1. Introduction

Let P be the set of all participants in the Soleer network, where:

• S ⊆ P represents service providers

• C ⊆ P represents clients

• A ⊆ P represents arbitrators

Each participant p ∈ P is identified by their Solana public key pair (pk, sk).

2. System Architecture

2.1 State Definitions

The global state Σ of Soleer at time t is defined as:

Σt = (L, E, R, T)

where:

• L: Set of active service listings

• E: Set of active escrow contracts

• R: Mapping of reputation scores

• T: Set of completed transactions

2.2 Service Listing Model

A service listing l ∈ L is defined as:

l = (id, s, μ, ρ, τ, α)

where:

• id: Unique identifier

• s ∈ S: Service provider

• μ: Service metadata

• ρ: Price in base units

• τ: Service duration

• α: Boolean activation status

3. Economic Model

3.1 Transaction Fee Structure

The platform fee f for a transaction value v is computed as:

f(v) = max(fmin, min(fmax, v × r))

where:

• fmin: Minimum fee threshold (0.1 SOL)

• fmax: Maximum fee threshold (10 SOL)

• r: Base fee rate (0.02)

3.2 Incentive Distribution

For each successful transaction, the reward distribution δ is:

δ(v) = (δs, δp, δa)

where:

• δs: Service provider share = v - f(v)

• δp: Platform share = f(v) × 0.7

• δa: Arbitrator pool share = f(v) × 0.3

4. Reputation System

4.1 Score Calculation

The reputation score R for a participant p at time t is calculated as:

R(p,t) = ∑(wi × fi(p,t))

where:

• wi: Weight of factor i

• fi: Scoring function for factor i

The primary factors and their weights are:

1. Transaction Success Rate (w1 = 0.4)

2. Client Satisfaction (w2 = 0.3)

3. Response Time (w3 = 0.2)

4. Dispute Resolution (w4 = 0.1)

4.2 Time Decay Function

Reputation scores are subject to exponential decay:

R'(p,t) = R(p,t0) × e^(-λ(t-t0))

where:

• λ: Decay constant (0.1 per month)

• t0: Time of last update

5. Escrow Mechanism

5.1 State Transitions

The escrow state machine E is defined by the tuple:

E = (Σ, S, s0, δ, F)

where:

• Σ: Input alphabet

• S: Set of states

• s0: Initial state

• δ: State transition function

• F: Set of final states

5.2 Smart Contract Logic

The escrow contract implements the following state transition function:

δ(s, a) = s'

where:

• s ∈ S: Current state

• a ∈ A: Action

• s' ∈ S: Resulting state

6. Dispute Resolution Protocol

6.1 Arbitrator Selection

The probability P(a) of selecting arbitrator a is:

P(a) = R(a) / ∑(R(ai))

where R(a) is the reputation score of arbitrator a.

6.2 Consensus Mechanism

For a dispute d, the resolution outcome O(d) is determined by:

O(d) = mode({va: a ∈ A'})

where:

• A' ⊆ A: Set of selected arbitrators

• va: Vote of arbitrator a

7. Security Analysis

7.1 Threat Model

We consider the following threat vectors:

1. Sybil attacks

2. Collusion attacks

3. Reputation manipulation

4. Smart contract vulnerabilities

7.2 Security Guarantees

The system provides the following security properties:

1. Transaction Integrity:

∀t ∈ T: Verify(t) ⇔ Valid(t)

1. Funds Safety:

∀e ∈ E: Balance(e) = Locked(e) ⇒ Safe(e)

1. Reputation Resistance: For any attacker A with computational power bounded by polynomial time:

Pr[ManipulateRep(A) = success] ≤ negl(λ)

where λ is the security parameter.

8. Performance Analysis

8.1 Throughput Model

The system throughput T is bounded by:

T ≤ min(Ts, Tp)

where:

• Ts: Solana network throughput (65,000 TPS)

• Tp: Platform processing capacity

8.2 Latency Analysis

The expected transaction latency L is:

L = Lb + Lp + Le

where:

• Lb: Blockchain confirmation time

• Lp: Platform processing time

• Le: External dependencies latency

9. Scalability Considerations

9.1 Horizontal Scaling

The system implements sharding through:

S = {s1, s2, ..., sn}

where each shard si handles a subset of transactions based on:

shard(tx) = hash(tx.id) mod n

9.2 State Channel Implementation

For high-frequency updates, state channels are implemented with:

C(p1, p2) = (σ0, {m1, ..., mn}, σn)

where:

• σ0: Initial state

• mi: State transitions

• σn: Final state